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Ethics and health technology
assessment: Handmaiden
and/or critic?
Annette J. Braunack-Mayer
University of Adelaide

Objectives: This study examines the content and role of ethical analysis in health
technology assessment (HTA) and horizon scanning publications. It proposes that ethical
analysis in HTA is of at least two different types: an ethics of HTA and an ethics in HTA.
Methods: I examine the critical differences between these approaches through the
examples of the analysis of genetic screening for breast cancer and home blood glucose
testing in diabetes. I then argue that, although both approaches subscribe to similar views
concerning HTA and ethics, they use different theoretical and methodological traditions to
interpret and explain them.
Results and Conclusions: I conclude by suggesting that we need the interpretive
insights of both these approaches, taken together, to explain why ethics has not been able
yet to contribute fully to HTA and to demonstrate the scope and complexity of ethical work
in this domain.
Keywords: Ethics, Social analysis, Procedure, Science and technology study

This study examines the role and content of ethics in health
technology assessment (HTA) and horizon scanning publications. Most HTA methodologists agree that ethics has a very
important role to play in HTA (1;15). Ethical analysis has
contributed significantly to health technology assessment in
at least two ways: (i) enhanced recognition of the value-laden
nature of HTA; and (ii) recognition of the role of public and
community consultation about new technologies.
Yet, despite its importance, ethical analysis has not been
fully integrated into health technology assessment reports
(2). A recent international review of HTA noted that over
half the organizations undertaking technology assessment
professed to include ethical, legal, and social assessment in
their analyses (19). However, these analyses are often rudimentary and poorly informed by recent work in social and
ethical theory and practice, and they rarely incorporate the
findings of studies of community views (24;25;26). Where
ethicists do contribute to the work of HTA units, there is not
always a clear understanding of the nature of the contribution
they make (17).
This study explores why this finding is so. I will develop
my argument by laying out two roles that ethics currently

fills with respect to HTA: the handmaiden role of ethics
in technology assessment and the critical role of ethics of
technology assessment. I will then suggest that we need the
interpretive insights of both these approaches, taken together,
to explain why ethical analysis is yet to realize its full potential with respect to HTA and to demonstrate the scope and
complexity of ethical work in this domain.

ETHICS IN AND ETHICS OF HTA
In 1970, Eliot Freidson, drawing on Robert Straus, popularized a now famous distinction between “sociology of
medicine” and “sociology in medicine” (7). Paraphrasing
Straus and Freidson’s distinction, one can describe the relationship between ethics and HTA in two ways:
Ethics in technology assessment consists of collaborative research
or teaching, often involving the integration of concepts, techniques,
and personnel from many disciplines. It takes as its object of interest
the analysis of ethical problems as they arise within the context of
new technologies.
307

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Wollongong, on 09 Apr 2018 at 01:56:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266462306051191

Braunack-Mayer
. . . the ethics of technology assessment is concerned with studying such factors as the organizational structure, role relationships,
value systems, rituals, and functions of HTA as a system of behavior and . . . this type of activity has generally been carried out by
persons operating from independent positions outside the formal
HTA setting.
On the one hand, the ethicist is collaborating with the HTA specialist
in trying to help her in the performance of her research functions;
on the other, she stands apart and studies HTA as an institution
or ethical system, challenging assumptions about what counts as
ethically legitimate in HTA activities and in the technological world
that HTA represents.

The typology proposed here brings together a range of
suggestions from other scholars. For example, Ashcroft distinguishes between “thin” and “thick” accounts of the relationship between ethics and HTA (1); and several papers in
volume 2 of Poiesis and Praxis describe both the “social shaping of technology (SST)” view of ethics in HTA and the “conventional” approach to ethics in HTA (5;8;11;12;17;24;26).
Each of these two approaches leads the ethicist to ask
particular kinds of questions and to ignore others. The ethicist working in HTA is concerned primarily with how new
technologies are used, in initial trials and/or in later evaluation of the technology (25). For example, the ethicist working
in HTA may carry out an ethical analysis of randomized controlled trials; here, he or she will assess informed consent
protocols for clinical trials, benefits and burdens for trial participants, randomization, stoppage rules for clinical trials,
and the possibility of coercive practices. Alternatively, the
ethicist working in HTA may focus on the likely impact of
introducing a new technology. The ethical issues here will
concern, for example, the likelihood of equitable access to
the new technology, issues associated with explaining the
technology to patients, the ethical significance of differing
sensitivities and specificities of tests, and the possibility of
extending the technology to new groups of patients.
An ethicist of HTA approaches new technologies in a
rather different way and asks different questions. Vos, for
example, indicates the types of questions an ethicist of HTA
will ask:
r
r
r
r

How does medical technology transform disease concepts and the
way the body is conceptualized in modern medicine?
How does the (daily) use of medical technology by patients shape
their views on disease, illness, and the body?
What are the relationships between technology and care (especially in chronic diseases)?
What implications should answers to these questions, albeit in a
provisional way, have for the evaluation of medical technology
(see 28, pages 2–3)?

Clearly, these two approaches can lead ethicists in two rather
different directions. In the following two sections, I offer two
examples of recent innovations in medicine—genetic screen308

ing for breast cancer and blood glucose self-monitoring—to
examine the differences between ethics in and ethics of HTA
approaches to these technologies.
GENETIC SCREENING FOR BREAST
CANCER
In 1999, the Canadian Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment produced a report on predictive genetic
testing for breast and prostate cancer (16). The aim of the
report was to
“[provide] the information necessary to understand the scientific
advances in these areas [predictive genetic testing for breast and
prostate cancer] and to appreciate their broader implications when
applied to clinical practice as a means of improving detection, treatment, and ultimately prevention of breast and prostate cancer” (see
16, page 1).

The report identifies a range of issues of ethical significance
that are typical of the ethics in HTA approach. First, the
report notes that informed consent is crucial when predictive genetic screening is contemplated. Consent information
needs to emphasize the
“voluntary and optional nature of testing as well as the potential
benefits including the accuracy of current diagnostic techniques,
the fact that test results cannot provide definitive information about
whether or when cancer will develop . . . and limitations in conventional options for screening and treatment” (see 16, page 28).

The information needs to be understandable, and providers
of information need to bear in mind possible risks (anxiety,
stigmatization, discrimination, and, for genetic information,
misidentified paternity) as well as the potential for DNA
banking. The rest of the section focuses on empirical studies
of consent to genetic testing and the authors end by noting
that “the impact of the consent process on decision making
for genetic testing is not clear to date” (16).
The second issue of importance concerns privacy and
confidentiality. Noorani and McGahan state that genetic information is unlike other health information in that it is both,
on the one hand, personal and private and, on the other, familial and nonindividual (see 16, page 30). They suggest that
health professionals may have an obligation to warn at-risk
family members so that these people can adopt early monitoring and prophylactic treatment if necessary and so they
can make informed reproductive choices. Despite this recommendation, they also recognize that learning unwanted
genetic information can be harmful; for example, if a patient learns that she is BRCA1-positive and, therefore, has
an 85 percent chance of developing breast cancer in her lifetime, this finding has consequences for her sisters and their
risk of developing breast cancer, whether they wish to know
that risk or not.

INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 22:3, 2006

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Wollongong, on 09 Apr 2018 at 01:56:35, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266462306051191

Ethics and health technology assessment

Lisa Parker takes a quite different approach to the same
issue of genetic screening for breast cancer susceptibility
(18). Parker describes her work as “critical bioethics,” a term
that might equally well be used to describe an ethics of HTA
approach. Parker begins by suggesting that an ethical analysis
of genetic screening for breast cancer needs to acknowledge
the role that genetic screening for breast cancer susceptibility
can play in shaping our values about and response to all types
of breast cancer. The huge amounts of money spent on the
Human Genome Project, the public perception that we are
being successful in locating genes for all kinds of diseases,
together with publicity about testing for the BRCA1 gene,
increases the likelihood that breast cancer will be labeled
as a genetic disease; through this process, all breast cancers
become “synonymous with genetically-linked breast cancer”
(see 18, page 320). The geneticization of breast cancer is
hazardous for two reasons. First, it may skew the provision
of funding for research, diagnosis, and treatment of breast
cancer. Second, it may increase the prevalence of simplistic
social perceptions of breast cancer (see 18, page 321).
Parker’s second observation is that breast cancer occupies a distinctive place in Western societies, for the organ
affected in breast cancer has particular social significance.
The iconic value of breasts in Western societies means that
any assault to this organ can become an assault on our values and beliefs about women and their role. Because of this,
Parker thinks that the interpretation of “facts” about breast
cancer becomes inevitably entwined with social, political,
and cultural values about breast cancer.
Parker also argues that the language we use to describe
breast cancer shapes, and is shaped by, our beliefs about
disease more generally. For example, applying the label of
“epidemic” to breast cancer constructs this disease as “on
the rise, spreading, or out of control” (see 18, page 323) and
defines those who acquire the disease as somehow responsible. Communities historically have responded to epidemics
by blaming those who carry the disease both for their own
illness and for the risk they create for other, hitherto unaffected, members of society (21). The development of genetic
screening tests, therefore, increases the risk that society will
label as socially irresponsible and deviant those who do not
wish to know their breast cancer risk or, even worse, know
they are BRCA1-positive but choose to do nothing about it.
BLOOD GLUCOSE SELF-MONITORING
AND DIABETES MANAGEMENT
My second example directs our attention away from a controversial technology and toward a much more mundane device.
The role of the blood glucose-monitoring device in people
with diabetes is to help keep blood glucose values within
normal limits. Patients can do this by self-monitoring, the
results of which are reviewed with a clinician who, through
the patient, can acquire a picture of the level of glycemic
control.

For the ethicist working in HTA, there appears to be
very little ethical significance in this technology. The ethical
questions, if any are considered at all, may address issues
such as the risks and harms affecting the user, the voluntariness of consent to use the new device, and the extent to
which the device is available to people across geographic and
socioeconomic divides. Such questions seem almost trivial,
and it is not surprising that several recent health technology
assessments of devices used to monitor blood glucose have
contained no consideration of any ethical issues at all (4;10).
However, an ethics of HTA approach suggests a rather
different picture. Anne Marie Mol’s account of the social
and ethical implications of home-based monitoring of blood
glucose shows how the miniature blood glucose monitor is
not merely a device that “passively register[s] the facts” (see
14, page 9). Rather, it actively intervenes in the patient’s life
in three ways: it alters what counts as normal, it changes patients’ relationships with their bodily sensations, and it shifts
the ownership of the suffering associated with the disease
(14).
First, the availability of self-monitoring of blood glucose has changed how normality is defined. Until its advent,
the moments in time when blood glucose could be measured
were limited to those times when patients came into the hospital or clinic and had their blood glucose monitored. Where
once the target of treatment was the blood glucose level registered while the patient was in the hospital or clinic, now
the target is the patient’s blood glucose levels measured over
the entire day, everyday. With more extensive monitoring,
tighter control is possible. What is acceptable now as a “normal” blood glucose for a diabetic is defined far more narrowly
than it once was. This tighter control becomes even more pronounced when patients begin to self-regulate and fine-tune
their insulin, exercise, or sugar intake to reflect their measured blood glucose. “The diagnostic device made to detect
abnormal blood sugars alters what counts as abnormal” (see
14, page 19).
Regular blood glucose measurement also changes how
patients respond to their bodies. Patients know there is a
correlation between abnormal blood sugars and symptoms.
However, because sensations are not a perfect indication of
glucose levels, patients who think that their blood sugar level
is dropping are advised to measure the levels with the machine before they do anything. Thus, this diagnostic device
undermines patients’ reliance on their own bodily awareness:
“by being put in the position of correcting subjective sensations with
objective findings they end up eroding the subjective sensations, or
at least, by making them of little relevance in the daily management
of (chronic) diseases” (see 14, page 15).

Ironically, as well as undermining sensation, the device can
also augment it, as patients learn to feel “hypoglycemic”
rather than “dizzy” or “light headed.”
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Finally, self-monitoring of blood glucose provides patients with greater freedom, from professionals and in their
daily lives. Where once patients were required to eat at certain hours, sleep regularly, and do about the same amount
of exercise each day, now they can vary these activities if
they know how to moderate their therapy. However, freedom
comes at a price. Professional oversight cannot be thrown
to the wind; patients must replace it with their own internal
monitoring. Their own blood sugar takes over as the master
whom they must obey or ignore. That takeover brings with it
new moral demands: where once suffering could be ascribed
to the disease, now failure to deal with the disease is the
cause for suffering (see 14, page 21). Through the apparently
noncontroversial example of blood glucose self-monitoring,
Mol shows how one medical device can shape patients’ and
doctors’ views of disease, illness, and the body, and alter the
locus of moral responsibility.
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
ETHICS IN AND ETHICS OF HTA
The examples given above clearly show the differences between ethical analyses carried out within and outside the
folds of health technology assessment. However, what the
examples do not make clear are the conceptual foundations
for these differences. In this section, I will explore these
foundations, beginning with three statements on which ethicists working in and outside HTA would agree: (i) HTA must
have an ethical component, (ii) community and public consultation is essential to HTA, and (iii) it has been difficult
to integrate ethical analysis into health technology assessments. I will show that, although ethicists in and of HTA
agree on these statements, they use different theoretical and
methodological traditions to interpret and explain them.
HTA Must Have an Ethical Component
Both the ethics in and ethics of HTA approaches grant that
HTA must have an ethical component. However, the two approaches regard the place of ethics in HTA in different ways.
The ethicist working in HTA believes that the ethical or evaluative components of a new technology can be identified and
separated out from the strictly technical or empirical analysis
(26). In this approach, HTA is conceptualized as a two-phase
process in which the first phase involves assessing the technology for safety and efficacy and the second evaluating the
wider social and ethical impact of the technology (25).
At least three things follow from characterizing the relationship between ethics and HTA in this way. First, this
approach sets HTA outside of society and culture, constructing it instead as an activity that occurs before the social world.
The primary role for ethical analysis and critique here is as
an addition at the end of the assessment process.
Second, the disciplinary home for the ethicist working in
HTA is traditional analytical philosophy. The ethical methodology most suited to this approach is principlist: it applies
310

principles to moral problems in a rigorous and deductivist
manner (3;9;27). The principlist approach to ethics—with
its mantra of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and
justice—is ideally suited, for it offers a series of general questions that can be asked of any situation and any technology.
Third, consistent with this principlist approach, ethics in
HTA tends to be preoccupied with the interests, rights, and
autonomy of individuals. It explores, for example, whether
individuals understand the implications of new technologies, whether their consent to participate in trials is coerced,
whether the false-positive rate of a new screening test will
have some bearing on the disease and health experiences of
individuals screened. Where the technology raises broader
questions, these questions are addressed primarily as they affect individuals. When the introduction of new technologies
leads to consideration of the allocation of resources, the primary question becomes not whether the technology itself is
distributed fairly, but rather whether access to the technology
is equitable for all individuals.
The ethics of HTA approach casts the relationship between ethics and HTA in a different light. It regards HTA
as a normative discipline itself, subject to the same norms
and values as the technologies it addresses. So, for example, the ethicist of HTA argues that presenting the survival
rates associated with the use of a technology suggests that
life itself is of preeminent value (see 20, page 249), whereas
using quality of life measures suggests that not all life is to
be equally valued. More fundamentally, the ethicist of HTA
regards the methods of technology assessment with the same
critical eye with which she regards new technologies: the
methods themselves are impregnated with a particular value
set, one which privileges certain kinds of knowledge and
certain professional groups over others (1).
The ethics of HTA draws on a diverse disciplinary and
methodology base to carry out its work. Ashcroft suggests
that there are at least three strands in the ethics of HTA
(1). First, there are the theoretical critiques of technology in
the works of Heidegger, Marx, Adorno, Foucault, and others.
These abstract and sweeping assessments of the place of technology in society seem far removed from the practical world
of HTA, and they appear to have relatively little analytical
and practical value for HTA. Second, there are sociological
accounts of specific technologies and contexts, which emphasize the value-laden nature of all technologies and technology assessments. Finally, there are studies of technology
and democracy: scholars working in several fields, specifically in Marxist, Foucauldian, and Habermassian frameworks, emphasize the challenge that technology continues to
offer democracy (1).
Community Consultation Has an Important
Role to Play in HTA
The point above brings to the fore a second area of difference between the ethics of HTA and ethics in HTA
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approaches, related to the relationship between HTA and
community consultation. Both ethics in and ethics of HTA
argue for an enhanced role for community consultation processes in technology assessment. However, they treat the process and outcomes of these consultations quite differently.
Ethicists working in HTA may include findings from
community consultations, where these are available, in their
ethical assessments, and/or they may suggest that dissemination of a new technology needs to be accompanied by
attempts to engage communities in discussion about the technology (22). Community consultations chiefly play an ancillary role here, providing data that can be used to supplement
technical decisions about the acceptability of a technology.
Ethicists working in this vein will ask questions such as,
What are the likely social costs and benefits of introducing this new technology? What do we know about people’s
beliefs and attitudes to this technology?
Ethicists of HTA interpret the need for community consultation quite differently. The reason one seeks to engage
the broader community in discussion of a new technology is
to create an environment for democratic deliberation. In such
deliberation, expert technical opinion on the technology (as
presented in a health technology assessment report) is just
that: one opinion among a range of opinions in a debate that
is acknowledged as political rather than technical (1).
It Is Difficult to Integrate Ethical Analysis
into Health Technology Assessments
Both ethicists in and ethicists of HTA agree that the integration of ethical assessments into health technology assessments has not always been particularly successful. However,
each offers different reasons for the lack of success (20).
For the ethicist working in HTA, the problems with integrating ethics into HTA are methodological and procedural
ones. The processes of HTA are such that it is difficult to
imagine how one can incorporate ethics assessment into the
work of a health technology assessment unit. For example,
technology assessments, particularly Horizon Scanning or
early warning systems, are rapid-response assessments that
require the ethicist to respond quickly to the call for commentary and feedback. When one adds to this the fact that
the request for ethics commentary usually occurs toward the
end of the preparation of a report, it is not surprising that the
ethicist working in HTA believes the task of integrating their
contribution into HTA to be a procedurally difficult one.
By contrast, for the ethicist of HTA, the integration
problem is a conceptual one. Because the ethics of HTA
evaluates health assessment just as much as it evaluates
the technology itself, critiquing a technology also calls into
question the social and cultural environment that sustains
it. The disciplinary base and methods adopted by HTA
methodologists—epidemiology, economics, systematic reviews, meta-analyses—are just as much the object of this
ethicist’s research as the technology itself is.

CONCLUSIONS
The ethics in and of HTA approaches are different. Yet, both
are important for ethical work in health technology assessment, not least because the two approaches together provide
a more comprehensive explanation for why ethics has not yet
reached its full potential in HTA. An ethics in HTA approach
can produce ethical analyses that are uncritical of their HTA
subject matter, narrow in their focus, and have relatively little
to add to assessments when technologies are noncontroversial. By contrast, an ethics of HTA approach, with its wide
ranging and critical perspectives, may be less palatable to
policy makers, clinicians, and the medical technology industry, resulting in abstract and general critiques that are of less
practical value to HTA methodologists.
This account of ethics in and of HTA suggests a tidy
distinction between the two endeavors, but the distinction,
in practice, is far from tidy. Ethical work in HTA in fact encompasses a plethora of approaches and a good deal of selfanalysis (6;13;23;27;28;29). What Fox notes in her analysis
of the wide range of perspectives in healthcare ethics generally might equally be ascribed, more narrowly, to ethical
work in HTA:
Casuistry, virtue ethics, narrative ethics, hermeneutics, and phenomenology are all being advanced as philosophical systems. Proposals to elevate the values of caring, solidarity, reciprocity, trust,
and love above the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice are repeatedly set forth. Enjoinders to incorporate feminist, literary, religious, social scientific, contextualist,
relational, subcultural and cross-cultural perspectives and interpretations more fully . . . proliferate (see 6, page 57).

Rather than trying to allocate these perspectives to either
ethics in or ethics of HTA, it makes more sense to celebrate
the diversity of perspectives available to ethicists and to acknowledge that the boundary between the two approaches is
a permeable one. Many ethicists work well with both kinds
of subject matter, and we should encourage them to do so.
As demonstrated above, we need to foster this richness in
ethical work if we are to display the broad, complex, and
multifaceted contributions that ethics can make to HTA.
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